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# Singapore

May 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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Armed Forces

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

The basic unit of the NIS is the *General Survey*, which is now published in a bound-by-chapter format so that topics of greater perishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters—Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the *General Survey* coverage may be bound into one volume.

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*This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the  
Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was sub-  
stantially completed by January 1973.*

# SINGAPORE

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## Armed Forces

### A. Defense establishment


The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) consist of the 14,500-man Singapore Army, the 1,000-man Maritime Command, and the 1,400-man Air Defense Command, plus four paramilitary organizations—the 7,400-man Singapore Police Force, the 6,000-man People's Defense Force, the 1,000-man Special Constabulary, and the 15,700-man Vigilante Corps. Since withdrawing from its federation with Malaysia in 1965, Singapore has developed its armed forces from the embryonic stage to a small but well-trained and well-equipped military establishment. The army has almost tripled in size, and the Maritime Command and Air Defense Command have been added to the military organization since early 1968. The army, which has undergone an extremely rapid expansion, could not presently withstand serious external aggression. (S)

The separation agreement between Singapore and Malaysia in 1965 called for bilateral arrangements on external defense and mutual assistance. Although a formal agreement has never materialized, a measure of informal cooperation does exist. The Anglo-Malayan External Defense and Mutual Assistance Agreement of 1957 by which the United Kingdom had the right to maintain bases and facilities on Singapore Island and use them in the defense of Malaysia, Singapore, and Commonwealth interests was replaced in November 1971 by the loose, consultative Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). Also under the terms of the now-superseded 1957 agreement, U.K. advisers were seconded (i.e., attached) to the Singapore forces. By provision of the FPDA, those elements of the British Far East Command located in Singapore were officially replaced on 1 November 1971 by an estimated 8,600-man ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, U.K.) force. The terms of the FPDA remain somewhat tenuous in that if an external threat appears imminent the member countries will consult on the appropriate course of action. The agreement does not obligate a member nation to commit a military force. (C)

Singapore, because of its strategic location, has long been a focal point for concentration of foreign military forces in the area. In addition, the small size of its military forces has required continued foreign military presence to assure stability in the area. A 1967 British decision to withdraw British military forces from East of Suez by the mid-1970's was therefore rescinded, as was the later decision in January 1968 to speed up the timetable for a complete withdrawal by the end of 1971. The Conservative government that came to power in Britain in 1970 felt that total withdrawal would weaken the security of Malaysia and Singapore and that a continuing military presence would help to preserve confidence in the area. It considered that the best military solution for the post-1971 presence in Southeast Asia would be to set up the integrated ANZUK Force in Singapore, based on plans that already existed for an Australian/New Zealand presence. The roughly 8,600-man ANZUK forces are under the overall command of an Australian rear admiral with a New Zealand brigadier as Chief of Staff. The ground forces are commanded by a British brigadier, the naval forces by a British commodore, and the air forces by an Australian air commodore. An Integrated Air Defense Command (IADC) was established on 1 September 1971; it is commanded by an Australian air vice marshal. An Air Defense Council, represented by all five nations, is responsible for the functioning of the IADC and provides direction to the IADC Commander on matters affecting its organization, training and development, and operational readiness. A Joint Consultative Council will also be set up to provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior official level on matters relating to the defense arrangements. All posts within the ANZUK command structure are rotated among the three nations. (S)

The British commitment to the ANZUK forces, as generally outlined in the Supplementary Statement of Defense Policy 1970 presented to Parliament on 28 October 1970, comprises one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, six destroyer-type ships, one submarine, four long-range reconnaissance aircraft

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When Singapore became independent in 1965 and started to raise its own armed forces, the Royal Navy and other Commonwealth navies were on hand and little thought was given to the need for a navy of Singapore's own. When Britain announced in 1968 the accelerated rate at which its forces would be withdrawn from the area, active planning began and a naval force, known at first as the Sea Defense Command (SDC), was established.

The SDC was to be an arm of the SAF and on the same level as the artillery, engineers, and other branches of the SAF. Its first officers were drawn from the ranks of the Singapore Naval Volunteer Reserve (SNVR), a carryover from the days when the Royal Malaysian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RMNVR) was centered in Singapore. Officers of the RMNVR had gained considerable experience in small patrol craft during the period of Indonesia's *Konfrontasi*. The SDC was given its present name, the Singapore Maritime Command (SMC), in 1969 and has acquired a more independent status than was at first envisaged. The SMC is an integrated part of the SAF coequal in stature with the Singapore Army.

The Singapore Air Defense Command was formed in 1963 with an army officer appointed as Principal Staff Officer for Air, within the SAF, responsible for coordinating air matters and setting up the air operations of the SAF. To obtain personnel, a recruiting campaign commenced in April 1968, and by June flight training had commenced at Seletar, using civil aircraft of local flying clubs to prepare initially selected candidates for overseas training. Selected technical training began in November 1968 after the SADC received its first aircraft, a Cessna 172 propeller-driven utility. Indigenous pilot training commenced in August 1969 at Seletar airbase. Since that time the SADC has developed at a fast pace and now includes a fighter and helicopter squadron, a training unit, and a reserve University Air Squadron (training).

In developing its small military establishment, Singapore has relied on Western sources for military equipment and training. Military equipment has been bought selectively, with emphasis on choosing late model, tested materiel best suited to its strategic and tactical needs. All the weapons acquired by Singapore are defensive, and all military planning has been defense oriented.

## 2. Command structure (S)

The President is the supreme commander of the Singapore Armed Forces; however, actual control over the army, maritime command, air defense command, and the reserves is vested in the Prime Minister, who exercises this control through the Ministry of Defense. Parliament determines the size and composition of the services and appropriates the funds for their support. The Ministry of Defense is headed by a civilian and is composed of four divisions—the General Staff, Logistics, Security and Intelligence, and Manpower; all but the first have civilian directors. With certain specific exceptions, administrative control of the armed forces is exercised by the acting first permanent secretary (operations) to the Defense Minister through the director of these divisions. A notable exception is the operational control exercised by appropriate ministry divisions over the army's noncombat units, e.g., the vehicle repair base; the weapons, ammunition and optical base; the electronics base; the general equipment base; and the central manpower base. The Director, General Staff, performs the functions of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and is responsible to the Minister of Defense through the Permanent Secretary. Operational control of the combat elements of the Singapore Armed Forces—military, maritime, and air defense commands—is exercised by the Director, General Staff, Ministry of Defense. Noncombat units, such as the various bases, are under the operational control of the appropriate division of the Ministry of Defense. The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute is included under the operational control of the Director, General Staff (Figure 1).

Under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defense, and as provided for under the 1965 Singapore Army Act, an Army Board was established on 1 January 1966 to deal primarily with matters pertaining to administration and discipline of the army. In 1972 the government introduced into Parliament a Singapore Armed Forces Bill which would replace the Singapore Army Act of 1965. Under the bill, a new Armed Forces Council would take the place of the existing Army Board for the administration of matters relating to the Singapore Armed Forces.

In August 1970 the former Ministry of Interior and Defense was split into two new ministries, Defense and Home Affairs. The Singapore Police Force at that time came under the control of the Home Affairs Ministry. Administrative control of the police is exercised by the




FIGURE 1. Command organization (C)

acting permanent Secretary to the Home Affairs Minister, while operational control is exercised by the Commissioner of Police.

## B. Joint activities

### I. Military manpower (S)

As of 1 January 1973 Singapore had 575,000 males within the ages of 15 to 49, of whom about 68% were fit for military service. The following is a tabulation by age group:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19 .....	139,000	105,000
20-24 .....	117,000	85,000
25-29 .....	80,000	55,000
30-34 .....	68,000	45,000
35-39 .....	62,000	40,000
40-44 .....	59,000	35,000
45-49 .....	50,000	25,000
Total, 15-49 .....	575,000	390,000

The average number of males reaching military age (18) annually, 1973-77, is expected to be about 29,000.

Initial selectivity by the regular army, along with stress on physical fitness and discipline, contribute to the high quality of personnel in this service. Morale and loyalty are considered generally high and *esprit de corps* is particularly high. The army has suffered from

a serious shortage of qualified officers and NCO's since the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and the withdrawal of experienced Malaysian personnel in 1965. While the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute is graduating second lieutenants at a sufficient rate, the shortage of experienced field-grade officers in high-level staff positions remains.

While the morale of the pilot personnel of the Singapore Air Defense Command is considered good to excellent, that of the seconded personnel with the command is considered poor. Consequently, the government has recently announced its desire to replace all Commonwealth personnel connected with the command. Absence of military tradition in the populace and the low rate of pay offered are cited as reasons for difficulty in procurement of pilot candidates.

The government has sought to resolve the problems faced by the armed forces and their reserves stemming from Singapore's estimated illiteracy rate of 30% by assigning the better educated volunteers and conscripts to the armed forces, the People's Defense Force, and the Special Constabulary. In general, illiterates or those less well educated go to the Vigilante Corps.

Government efforts to reduce the potential for friction and rivalry inherent in the multiracial composition of the armed forces and the reserves include the use of English as the common language and assignment of English-speaking personnel in

positions of command and responsibility. Political indoctrination of Singapore's armed forces reduces the dangers of subversion. Within the reserve organizations, the incentives of pay and uniforms reinforce the ideological training that aims to provide a sense of national identity and loyalty to the government and its ruling party.

The National Service Bill (Amendment) of March 1967 required all citizens both male and female, whose 18th birthdays fell on or after 1 January 1967, to register for national service. All eligibles would receive basic training, after which 10% would be selected for full-time military service to serve 2 years of active duty and 10 years of reserve duty; the remaining 90% would be in part-time service with the People's Defense Force, Special Constabulary, or the Vigilante Corps, paramilitary organizations which constitute the reserves for the armed forces and police. Registrants indicate preference for full-time or part-time training, as well as preference for branch of service. Failure to register can result in a maximum of 6 months in jail or a fine of about the equivalent of US\$650, or both, on conviction. Registrants are issued certificates which must be carried at all times, and failure to produce a certificate on the request of a police officer can subject the individual to arrest.

As of 1 December 1967, all male Singapore citizens enrolled or registered full-time or part-time in institutions of higher learning at home or abroad became liable for national service. Excluded, however, were those who were less than 16½ or more than 30 years of age at the time of college registration and also those liable for national registration under an earlier notification. Those persons selected from the national register for full-time service are to be called up only after completion of their studies. These measures were designed to provide a number of better qualified individuals to fill administrative, professional, and some command positions. In effect, they extend the liability for national service registration to an older, more highly educated segment of Singapore's citizens.

Through the National Service Bill, Singapore has been able to strengthen its defense and promote a sense of national unity. The bill has not only afforded direct contact between the government, the ruling party, and the people but also has enlarged the reserve system and created temporary employment and job training for a segment of Singapore's population in which unemployment is the highest. It has given Singapore a centralized defense force, with all services wearing the same uniform and receiving the same basic training. The National Service plan envisages annual additions of about 1,600 to the army, 2,200 to the People's Defense Force, 6,000 to the Special

Constabulary, and 6,000 to the Vigilante Corps—a total of roughly a 16,000-man increment will go into the National Service Reserve. Such transferred personnel will have served 2 years on active duty and will thereafter continue in the reserve for 10 years more. The People's Defense Force is the reserve for the army, and the Special Constabulary and Vigilante Corps are the reserves for the police force. Total service in the People's Defense Force extends for 12 years or until the age of 40, whichever is later. Personnel in the two police reserve organizations serve for 12 years.

The regular army mobilization capability, with outside logistic help and some augmentation of officer personnel, is estimated as follows:

		IN- FANTRY	AR- TILLERY	ARMORED	COM- MANDO
M-Day	12,000	10	3(-)	3(-)	1(-)
M+15	12,300	10	3(-)	3(-)	1(-)
M+30	12,500	10	3(-)	3	1(-)
M+90	14,000	12	3	3	1(-)
M+180	16,000	13	3	3	1
M+1 Year	19,000	15	3	3	1
M+2 Years	34,000	18	3	3	1

Without outside support, the Singapore Army could reach full mobilization in M+3 years with 34,000 troops.

## 2. Strength trends (S)

Since Singapore's withdrawal from Malaysia in 1965, the regular army has expanded rapidly to its present level but is expected to level off and become much more static. Latest known plans had called for an end strength of 17,500 by the end of 1972. Armed forces personnel strengths, in round figures, since 1959 have been as follows:

	ARMY	POLICE	AIR DEFENSE COMMAND	MARITIME COMMAND	TOTAL
1959	630	5,300			5,930
1960	630	5,300			5,930
1963	1,700	6,100			7,800
1964	1,700	7,000			8,700
1965	1,700	7,000			8,700
1966	3,300	7,000			10,300
1967	3,500	7,400			10,900
1968	4,200	6,500			10,700
1969	5,500	6,500	300	400	12,700
1970	7,000	7,200	550	500	15,250
1971	12,000	7,400	550	500	20,450
1972	14,500	7,400	1,400	1,000	24,300

Under presently known plans, police strength is expected to remain static. As the army annual intakes of about 1,600 occur, an almost equal number will be

transferred to the army reserves, which will eventually expand well beyond the size of the regular army. Annual intakes of slightly over 14,000—2,250 to the People's Defense Force and 6,000 each to the Vigilante Corps and the Special Constabulary—will result in a substantial portion of Singapore's population receiving some degree of military training.

### 3. Training (S)

Training of Singapore's armed forces has been largely conducted by the British with some Australian and New Zealand assistance. Since 1966, the Israelis have made an important contribution. Out-of-country training of Singaporeans has been given in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and the United States.

The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) was established in July 1966 as a training school for officers and NCO's and other enlisted personnel for service in the Army, the People's Defense Force (PDF), and the police. In that year, after the United Arab Republic and India showed little interest in assisting in training, Singapore contracted with Israel for about 30 military advisers, most of them officers in the Israeli Defense Force Army.

SAFTI, now about 6 years old, is capable of training 3,000 to 4,000 inductees at one time under the supervision of a cadre of approximately 800. All students for the basic training course come directly from the induction centers. Almost the entire effort of the institute is directed in support of the infantry arm of the army. No training is given to the Maritime Command, and only a "physical training/morale-building program" is provided for newly recruited members of the Singapore Air Defense Command. Artillery and armor battalions conduct their own basic training at other locations. Classification of inductees, based on thorough physical and mental examinations, determines the branch of service each will enter. This classification is accomplished at the induction centers and not at SAFTI.

The institute comprises 40 buildings which include training, messing, billeting, and recreational facilities. Billets for the trainees are small but neat and adequate; they compare favorably with U.S. military billeting standards. Language training is vigorously pursued at the institute, and all trainees receive instruction in the language in which they are least proficient (English, Mandarin, or Malay). The army hopes to have all officers proficient in two languages within 3 years. The training day is 0530 to 1730, with night training conducted four times per week.

All military personnel in the armed forces undergo basic military training of 7 months at SAFTI. After completion, each is assigned to a unit. Unit screening returns some to Section Leaders School. After graduation from this course, some return for 5 months of training as officer cadets. Officer cadets, upon graduation, assume a total obligation of 3 years active service, including time spent in training.

The Singapore Armed Forces Technical Training Institute (SAFTEC) was established in 1969 and trains technical personnel for the military, air, and maritime departments. Originally oriented to the Singapore Air Defense Command, the school began about March 1970 to integrate a number of army training programs into its mission. The first army course to be transferred to the SAFTEC was the Auto Mechanics Course. SAFTEC is now conducting virtually all technical training.

An Armed Forces Staff College was established in 1969 and graduated its first class of 28 students in February 1970. With this school available for field grade officers, the armed forces hope to alleviate some of the problems caused by inexperienced officers being assigned to the higher staff levels.

### 4. Military budget (C)

Singapore's defense budget is prepared by the Ministry of Defense and is reviewed by the Ministry of Finance before it is submitted by the cabinet to Parliament as part of the internal security and defense portion of the national budget. Singapore's defense expenditures have increased as a result of the British military withdrawal and recognition of the fact that the FPDA cannot be relied on for Singapore's defense under all conditions. In absolute terms, total military spending more than doubled between FY1970/71 and FY1972/73. Actual defense expenditures for FY1970/71 and FY1971/72 and the defense budget for FY1972/73 are shown in Figure 2.

### 5. Logistics (C)

Singapore's excellent harbor and berthing facilities have combined to make the city-state one of the world's leading commercial ports and a focus of air and sea routes in Southeast Asia. The economy can give only limited support in the production of military items. Production is limited to some small arms and ammunition, quartermaster-type equipment, and small patrol craft. All other materiel is imported. When Singapore left the federation of Malaysia in 1965, the armed forces were equipped primarily with materiel from the United Kingdom. Since that time,

FIGURE 2. Defense expenditures (C)  
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

	FY1970/71*	FY1971/72*	FY1972/73*
Defense expenditures.....	122.2	169.9	**248.9
Defense as a percentage of total expenditures.....	23.7	27.8	27.1

NOTE—Fiscal year; 1 April–31 March.

\*Prior to yearend 1971, the exchange rate was S\$3.06 = US\$1.00; in 1972 it was approximately S\$2.50 = US\$1.00.

\*\*Budget figure.

important items of military equipment have been obtained from Australia, Israel, Switzerland, and the United States.

Singapore began making the U.S. 5.56-mm AR-15 rifle, a version of the M-16, in 1970. The Government of Singapore has a licensing agreement with Colt to produce up to 200,000 of these rifles over a 10-year period. Machinery which enables Singapore to produce 3,000 rifles per month was purchased from Colt and installed in the government-owned Chartered Industries ammunition plant in 1969. This plant has been making 5.56-mm ammunition for the AR-15 rifle since 1967. A second facility was established in 1970 to assemble mortar ammunition. Also owned by Chartered Industries, it is located near the ammunition and rifle plant. At present, it produces explosives and loads and assembles mortar rounds up to 120-mm in size, using imported components.

Information available on logistics is limited. However, when Singapore separated from Malaysia it was indicated that logistical support for Singaporean units would be handled on a contract basis with local civilian firms. Food, clothing, and petroleum supplies were to be procured in this manner. Transportation requirements were to be handled by assigning all motor vehicles to the units themselves and arranging vehicle maintenance through civilian contract, thus obviating the need for a Transportation Corps. It was foreseen that logistical support would be one of the major problems resulting from the separation, because the logistical support and maintenance elements to be transferred to Singapore were very small.

The Weapons, Ammunition, and Optical Base, located at Kalang, serves as the receiving depot and main storage area for the armed forces' weapons and ammunition, except heavy caliber ammunition. The base is a small, relatively heavily guarded military installation comprising approximately six one-story and one two-story building. All incoming shipments of weapons, small arms ammunition, and optical equipment (presumably artillery battery commander's

scopes, sights, and similar items) are brought directly from the docks to the base for unpacking, inspection, and storage. Heavy arms ammunition is stored in a magazine at the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute.


### C. Ground forces

The Singapore Army is a small, versatile, well-trained, and fairly well equipped force which is still in a developing stage. The army is responsible for territorial defense and for support of the police in maintaining internal security; in addition, it has been given a "nationbuilding" mission. Along with the other armed forces, it has a secondary but highly emphasized function of propaganda training for Singapore's youth in building a multiracial society and inculcating a sense of national unity. It is capable of maintaining internal security, but its capability for external defense is limited; major outside assistance would be required to cope with any significant attacking force. (C)

Founded upon universal national service, the military forces are a source of pride to Singaporeans and have played a major role in instilling a sense of national identity into the predominantly Chinese population. The well-disciplined forces make a major contribution to the buoyant, confident optimism regarding the future that pervades Singapore. (C)

The Government of Singapore is well aware of the potential role of the military in coups and systematically rotates key officials and officers (thus cutting down on opportunities to build a personal following) and divides authority through organizational means (e.g., the man who controls the artillery does not control the ammunition). Army personnel are well respected by the population and generally remain aloof from politics; to date, the army has shown no sign of becoming a political force. Although the rapid expansion of the army to its present strength has somewhat diminished its combat effectiveness, the combination of national service and an officer training

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personnel to the armed forces and controls the Central Manpower Base.

There is no territorial organization.

## 2. Strength, composition, and disposition (S)

The Singapore Army has an estimated strength of 14,500 men, but this figure will fluctuate as it progresses toward the expected ultimate goal of 17,500. The regular army is organized into four brigades, two commands, and two separate battalions. The 2d and 3d Singapore Infantry Brigades each control three infantry battalions. Both the 4th Armored Brigade and the Artillery Command are also comprised of three battalions. The Engineer Command consists of two battalions. Independent of these units are two battalions: a signal and a commando battalion. The 1st Singapore Infantry Brigade comprises the active reserve element (People's Defense Force) of the army and consists of four infantry battalions (Figure 3).

Tactical organization is patterned very closely after the British model. The largest tactical unit is the infantry battalion (authorized strength of about 700 officers and enlisted men), which comprises a battalion headquarters, a headquarters company, a support company, and three rifle companies. The overall organization of the army will continue to fluctuate as it expands and develops.

The individual weapon is the U.S. AR-15 rifle, of which 23,000 were purchased by a direct sales contract. Modern automatic weapons and 60-mm,

80-mm, and 120-mm (Figure 4) mortars have been obtained from British, Israeli, and other sources. A total of 57 U.S. 106-mm recoilless rifles and ¼-ton jeeps for their transport have been procured. A contract has been signed for 66 additional jeeps, and 394 more may be purchased in the near future.

## 3. Training (C)

Singapore Army training is strongly British-oriented but has been influenced to a large degree by the Israeli advisers who have been in the country since 1966. The essential objective of the training program conducted by and for the army is two-fold: development of judgment, initiative, and quick reaction on the part of junior officers and enlisted men, and to promote a sense of national unity.

Individual training at the recruit level is conducted in the basic training course of the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) located at Pasir Laba Camp (Figure 5). SAFTI, established in 1966, provides infantry training up to platoon level and advanced training to officers at company level, as well as specialized training in support weapons and military medicine. Basic military training is of 7 months' duration, and the training day is 0530-1730, with night training conducted four times per week. During the basic phase, physical conditioning, drill, fieldcraft, and survival are stressed, and there are practical exercises in weaponry and marksmanship with individual weapons (Figure 6).




FIGURE 4. 120-mm mortars and crew pass in review during a Singapore Armed Forces Day Parade (U/OU)




FIGURE 5. Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (C)



FIGURE 6. Field exercise during basic training at the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) (U/OU)

Initial officer training is at the Cadet Officer Course (a part of SAFTI) for a period of 5 months (Figure 7). Other training provided by SAFTI for officers is the Leadership Course and the Advanced Officer Course. The Singapore Armed Forces Staff College, established in 1969, is available for selected field grade officers. Little is presently known of retention rates at these schools or of their training schedule. Selected officers are sent to various command and staff officer courses within the Commonwealth and to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

After about 12 weeks of basic military training, the soldiers assigned to the engineer branch attend a 6-week Basic Engineer Course. After this, some are sent to the various combat courses: Medical Orderly's Course, Signaller's Course, Heavy Plant and Field Plant Operator's Course, Armor Engineer's Course, Support Arms, and Section Leader's Course. Upon successful completion of these courses, the engineer rejoins his Field or Heavy Plant Company. Some may

start on the 9-week Advanced Engineer Course. The end of this course marks the beginning of operational duties for the engineer-soldier. Personnel of the artillery and armor branch receive training in their specialties given by their respective branches of the army. These training programs follow the same general scheme as that of the engineer branch.

Within the 5th Singapore Infantry Regiment, language classes in English and Mandarin are held for the pre-section leaders (i.e., section leaders in training and not yet assigned), who are all regulars. These classes are held daily and each session lasts for about 4 hours. In MINDEF itself, thrice-weekly classes in Mandarin, of 1 hour's duration, are held for senior officers. At the main language center in SAFTI, classes for all three groups of pre-section leaders, officer cadets, and officers are held daily for the first two groups and twice weekly for the officers. In SAFTI, class lessons are supplemented with lessons in the language laboratory. The duration of an English or



FIGURE 7. Newly commissioned officers render honors at a passing out ceremony (U/OU)

Mandarin course varies, depending on the type and frequency of classes. Some courses last a month but the usual period is 12 weeks. The standard of English or Mandarin taught varies from basic and elementary key words to pre-university level.

The training facility for army medics is the School of Military Medicine at SAFTI, which turns out about 500 combat medical orderlies and 80 noncombat orderlies and army nurses yearly. The duration of the course varies from 4 months of training for a combat medic to 10 weeks for a noncombat medic. Subjects include such things as anatomy and physiology, pharmacology, diseases, nursing procedures, bacteriology, field first aid, preventive medicine, and battalion medical tactics. The medics are given a great deal of practical instruction, from bandaging techniques to proper injection of medicine. At the end of the course, qualified medical orderlies are sent to units or bases. The failure rate is about 10% for each Combat Medical Orderly Course.

#### 4. Logistics (C)

Logistics for the army is a function of the Logistics Division of the Ministry of Defense, which handles logistical activity for all services. Specific information concerning this division's support of the army alone is lacking. Small arms, including U.S. AR-15 rifles and U.S. 106-mm recoilless rifles and ammunition apparently are stored at and issued from the Weapons Ammunition and Optical Base and heavy weapons and their ammunition from the magazine at the training institute.

#### D. Navy

The missions of the Singapore Maritime Command (SMC) are to defend Singapore's territorial waters, assist in maintaining customs and maritime laws, and

provide waterborne support to the army and air defense command. Coastal surveillance radar stations and the small modern gunboat force enable the SMC to effectively patrol Singapore's small territorial waters and provide important support to the marine police units in law enforcement. However, pending completion of the new guided-missile boats under construction, the SMC could not defend against an attack by either the Malaysian or Indonesian navies, much less an attack by a major naval power. With only one amphibious ship and four landing craft, the SMC can provide only small-scale logistic support to its sister services. For all practical purposes its amphibious warfare capability is nonexistent. (C)

Salient points of strength include a compact efficient organization, modern ships and equipment, the small geographic area which must be defended, a high-caliber pool of civilian personnel from which to draw, an excellent maritime industrial base, and the experience and leadership provided by a Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) training team. Principal weaknesses include the very small number of ships and personnel, a critical lack of underway experience (especially among SMC engineering officers), the lack of an adequate operational base, inadequate naval air defense, and the strategic problem of defending from naval attack a small island surrounded by foreign territorial waters. (C)

#### 1. Organization (S)

The Maritime Staff, composed of two departments—Personnel and Logistics—forms a section of the integrated General Staff. Administrative control extends from the Commander, SMC, down through the Deputy (who also functions as Principal Staff Officer) and Department Heads to the Senior Officer Flotilla (for afloat units) and to the individual commanders of SMC shore bases. The Senior Officer Flotilla, in turn, administers the patrol and training squadrons and single ships not assigned to a squadron. A third squadron will probably be formed when the guided-missile boats become operational. Tactical control of units within Singapore's territorial waters is exercised directly by the Duty Officer in the Ministry of Defense Operations Room. During the two occasions when SMC ships made show-the-flag cruises (to Brunei and to Pinang, Malaysia) the Commander, SMC, went along and exercised tactical control. No information is available regarding the Ministry of Defense tactical communications systems, although the units of the patrol squadron all have HF single side-band transceivers and probably UHF line-of-sight equipment.

FIGURE 8. *Independence*, a "Type A" fast patrol boat built by Vosper Thornycroft Ltd. in Portsmouth, England in 1970, is 110 feet long, and has a 40-mm gun forward, a 20-mm gun aft. Two Maybach diesels give this craft a maximum speed of 32 knots. (U/OU)





FIGURE 9. A more advanced fast patrol boat is the Vosper Thornycroft "Type B" of which class *Sovereignty*, completed in 1971, was the prototype. Steel-hulled but with an aluminum superstructure, *Sovereignty* has a 76-mm Bofors forward, a 20-mm Oerlikon aft, and can maintain a continuous sea speed of over 25 knots (32 knots is maximum speed). Her range is over 1,000 n.m. at 15 knots. (U/OU)

## 2. Strength, composition, and disposition<sup>1</sup> (S)

The patrol squadron consists of six modern, Vosper Thornycroft 110-foot motor gunboats (PGM) (Figures 3 and 9). One old PGM and one new training/patrol craft (YP) comprise the training squadron. Individual ships not assigned to a squadron include one tank landing ship (LST) leased from the U.S. Navy, four medium landing craft (LCM), and three river-roadstead patrol craft (PSB). Of the six large guided-missile patrol boats (PTEG) on order, two have been delivered from West Germany with the first being used as a prototype for the remaining four to be locally built. They will be armed with the Israeli Gabriel surface-to-surface missile and one 57-mm and one 40-mm gun. These units will probably be given a new class designation, although they are basically similar to the Israeli *Saar* class and West German Type-148 PTEG's. All six units should become operational by the end of 1975. All units are officially based at Pulau Brani, although sufficient mooring facilities are not yet available for all ships and craft.

<sup>1</sup>See also the *Military Intelligence Summary* and the *Automated Naval Order of Battle*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Personnel strength is estimated at about 1,000, although no breakdown into officers and men is available. There is, in addition, a 250-man People's Defense Force (Sea) reserve, which could probably be fully mobilized within 15 days. This reserve force, however, receives little in the way of training and would be of little importance in an emergency.

There are four principal SMC shore bases. The radar detection unit consists of three stations covering the southern sea approaches to Singapore. The maritime base and the maintenance and supply base are both being constructed at Pulau Brani, a small island just south of Singapore. When completed, about 1975, the maritime base will provide operational support and the maintenance and supply base logistics support to all units of the SMC. In addition, the latter base may support the boats of the police and customs fleets. The fourth base, the School of Maritime Training, is located at Jurong. A fifth shore command, the Maritime Technical Training School, is an integral part of SAFTECH, Selatlar, and probably receives little SMC direction or control.

## 3. Training (S)

The School of Maritime Training provides all basic training of enlisted personnel, while the Maritime

Technical School provides advanced technical training. All officer training, except for the informal on-the-job variety, must be conducted abroad, principally in Commonwealth countries. School training of both officers and enlisted personnel appears to be of high quality. Practical underway experience is the most significant training shortfall. This is being remedied by the recent activation of the training squadron, the public relations cruises to Brunei and Malaysia, and the arrival of the New Zealand training team. The team itself consists of about 15 seconded officers and men who are entirely integrated into the SMC; the Senior Officer Floilla, for example, is a seconded RNZN officer. In addition to the training team, a RNZN captain is assigned as naval adviser to the Minister of Defense. This officer apparently has no direct connection with the training team and probably advises on long-range, strategic naval planning. Combined Commonwealth naval exercises are routinely held in Malaysia-Singapore waters. So far, SMC participation has been token, but the arrival of the guided-missile boats in 1973 will allow a greater role for the SMC.

#### 4. Logistics (S)

Logistics support is basically a Ministry of Defense function, with the head of the logistics department, Maritime Staff, acting in a coordinating role. When fully established, the maintenance and supply base will provide all repair and supply requirements for the SMC. The supply function is probably being carried out, but the current repair capability is very modest. Major repair and overhaul of SMC ships and craft must be contracted out to commercial shipyards.

Commercial ship repair and construction facilities are some of the finest in Asia, second only to Japan. The principal naval ship constructor has been Vosper Thornycroft Uniters (VTU), which constructed four of the six new PGM's for the SMC; the other two were constructed in the United Kingdom. A new shipyard has been established in Jurong with the aid of the West German firm of Lurssen and is building four of the SMC's guided-missile boats, the first two having been built in Germany. The former British Royal Navy base at Sembawang has been largely returned to commercial use, with only a small area reserved for ANZUK Naval Force use.

#### E. Air force


The missions of the Singapore Air Defense Command (SADC) include air defense and tactical support of ground and naval forces. The young SADC,

in being since 1968, is still in the developmental stage and has a very modest combat capability. In name, the SADC is an air defense force. With the purchase in mid-1972 of 48 surplus U.S. Douglas A-4B attack aircraft, however, an important ground support role is being developed that may ultimately become as important as, if not more important than, the so-called air defense role. (S)

The SADC's air defense force is limited to one early warning/ground controlled interception (EW/GCI) site and one partially equipped surface-to-air missile (SAM) section. In 1971 Singapore assumed operation of the British EW/GCI site at Bukit Gombak (Sembawang airfield). The radar provides cover to Singapore and immediate environs and, together with those in Malaysia, provides contiguous coverage of the Malay Peninsula against high-altitude targets, but coverage against low-altitude targets is localized in the Singapore and Pinang, Malaysia, areas. Early in 1972, the SADC received 16 refurbished British Bloodhound Mk-2 SAM's and eight launchers for its air defense system; 56 missiles and 28 launchers were ordered. This is sufficient to equip one section of a proposed three-section squadron with eight missiles on launchers and eight reloads. The partially equipped section at Seletar airbase has the eight launchers and 16 missiles emplaced. The other two sections are to be located at Tuas and Amoy Quee. The United Kingdom provided missile training assistance, and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is to provide a small number of personnel on loan to bring the squadron to operational status. (S)


The SADC's Hawker Hunter day-fighter and British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Strikemaster attack aircraft can provide only subsonic clear-weather interception. Air defense cover for the area is provided by two squadrons of RAAF Dassault Mirage III-O all-weather jet fighters stationed at Butterworth, Malaysia. A detachment of six to eight of these aircraft deploy to Tengah, Singapore, on a rotational basis, primarily to provide target practice for the Bukit Gombak radar site. These aircraft operate within the framework of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA). An Integrated Air Defense Command (IADC) for Malaysia and Singapore, within the context of the FPDA, was formed September 1971. Scant progress has been made in its development, however, and both Malaysia and Singapore are independently pursuing their own air defense buildups. The IADC operates under the direction of a single FPDA commander, who is an Australian, with headquarters at Butterworth airbase, Malaysia. The two RAAF Mirage squadrons are its only real contribution. (S)

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


FIGURE 12. Hawker Hunter day-fighter of the Singapore Air Defense Command (U/OU)



FIGURE 13. Singapore Air Defense Command Alouette III helicopter in air-rescue exercise (U/OU)




FIGURE 14. New Zealand-manufactured Airtourer utility aircraft of the Singapore Air Defense Command (U/OU)

may be accepted to age 25. Educational requirements for applicants include completion of high school or equivalent (approximately junior college level), with passing grades in mathematics and physics or chemistry or school certificate, Grades I and II, with credits in the same subjects. Malay candidates are in a minority among applicants for pilot training and are, as a rule, only marginally qualified. The poor vision of applicants is a major rejection factor. Procurement of pilot candidates is further hampered by a lack of large numbers of aspirants, due largely to the absence of military tradition in the populace.

After completing a 4-month basic military course at the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute, cadet pilots begin flying training at the Flying Training School at Changi. The school, under British supervision, conducts a 16-month flying training course, which includes 120 hours of primary flying training in the Siai-Marchetti SF-260 prop utility aircraft and 162 hours of basic flying training in the BAC-167 Strikemaster jet attack aircraft. The latter also includes an 82-hour weapons course. Although the quality of instruction is excellent, this flying training program has fallen short of desired standards. In December 1970, the first class of 12 pilots completed training in the BAC-167. These represent the total gleaned from 300 applicants and the only graduates of a class of 32. No Malays were included in the class. The remainder of the students were categorized as light aircraft pilots, air traffic controllers, or fighter controllers. Advanced flying training (including an operational conversion course) is carried out in the United Kingdom in Hawker Hunter jet aircraft. There are plans to form an operational conversion unit at Tengah airbase. A-4B pilots will probably go through conversion training in the United States.

Ground technical training is conducted at the Air Technical Training School at Seletar. Initially, instruction at this facility was contracted to some 40 British personnel. This contract has expired, but the school retains about a dozen expatriate Royal Air Force and Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm personnel on its staff on an individual contract basis. Ten scrapped British Javelin F-9 all-weather jet fighters are used as training aids, but the school is otherwise severely handicapped by the lack of instructional equipment. Courses include such specialties as aircraft and engine maintenance; instrument, armament and electrical maintenance; and photography. Most advanced technical training is carried out overseas, primarily in the United Kingdom, but the SADC plans to

progressively take over all technical instruction as personnel with the necessary skills become available.

Air traffic controllers have been trained by the Department of Civil Aviation, and radar operators/technicians were given on-the-job training at the Bukit Gombak radar site.

Seven months of basic military training for recruits is given at the Armed Forces Training Institute.

In addition to the U.K. contributions, France, New Zealand, Israel, and the United States have also provided training assistance.

#### 4. Logistics (S)

Singapore is dependent on outside sources for aviation materiel. Main sources of supply include the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, and the United States. Major items on order from the United Kingdom include 27 additional Hawker Hunter aircraft, 6 Short Skyvan light transports, and additional Bloodhound SAM's. Delivery of all items is expected during 1973. The Government of Singapore has also purchased 48 surplus U.S. Douglas A-4B jet subsonic single-seat lightweight attack bombers, with delivery commencing in 1972. This acquisition will probably delay until 1974-75 the purchase of supersonic jet fighters that has been under consideration.

The contract with Hawker de Havilland of Australia for organizational maintenance of SADC aircraft expired in March 1972 and has not been renewed. About 70 of its former employees have been retained, however, on an individual contract basis. Most of the work is performed at Tengah airbase. Depot-level maintenance of aircraft is contracted to U.S. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, which operates from Seletar airbase with an option to use hangar space at Changi; Lockheed will refurbish the newly purchased A-4B's. Quality of maintenance is excellent, and aircraft serviceability rates average between 70% and 80%.

All equipment acquisition is carried out by the Logistics Division of the Ministry of Defense. The Air Logistics Staff Officer advises the ministry on supply and maintenance matters, reporting directly to the Director of Logistics. The SADC air supply organization, referred to as Air Supply Base, Seletar, is involved in the stocking and distribution of supply items.

Scant information is available on supply levels of spare parts and aviation fuel, but there is not believed to be a shortage of either.

## F. Paramilitary (S)

The 7,400-man Singapore Police Force, comprising numerous operational area detachments, is organized into eight geographical sections and several special headquarters divisions that include Criminal Investigation, Marine, and Radio Divisions. The police are charged with the mission of internal security, suppression and surveillance of dissident elements, and maintenance of law and order. In its task of internal security, the police force is supported by the army. The police force, considered one of the best in Southeast Asia, is directly under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is multiracial, and is closely identified with the populace. It is well equipped, well trained, experienced in antidissident operations, and effective in maintaining public order. Equipment consists of AR-15 rifles, revolvers, sawed-off 12-gauge shotguns, Land-Rovers, and sedans, all in excellent condition.

As in the army, the ruling People's Action Party exercises close political control; it has placed personnel in the police force to give political and citizenship instruction and to identify and eliminate subversion.

Within the police force, the Internal Security Department is charged with the collection and collation of security intelligence. Its personnel are of high quality, have high standards of integrity, and are extremely efficient. The Police Marine Division patrols the numerous islands, harbor areas, and territorial waters day and night, in conjunction with the Commonwealth and Malaysian naval forces. It also assists the Singapore Customs Department in controlling smuggling, piracy, and illegal immigration. The Marine Division is considered to be an effective force, adequately equipped and trained.

The Singapore Government has delegated to the local police strict and effective police powers. Derived primarily from the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance of 1955, power has been given to the police to detain persons for 2 years without trial, and such detentions can thereafter be extended in 6-month increments by approval of the Internal Security Committee, replaced in 1970 by the Joint Intelligence Committee. This power, along with the authority to restrict residence, immigration, employment, and activities, has proved extremely effective against gangsters, subversives, and secret society members and has been instrumental in Singapore's considerable success in controlling such activities.

In addition to the police, Singapore's paramilitary forces also include the People's Defense Force, which is an army reserve organization with a 50-man air component—the University Air Squadron—and a

250-man naval component, and two police reserve organizations, the Special Constabulary and the Vigilante Corps.

The People's Defense Force is an estimated 6,000-man volunteer and national service force. One of its functions is the preparation of certain selected units for transfer to the regular army when they are fully trained and equipped. This reserve organization also has a major role, in the absence of insurrection or external attack, of fostering national consciousness and racial tolerance by forcing together in a training situation the disparate elements of Singapore's multiracial population. The PDF is composed of both volunteers and national servicemen, who are disqualified for regular service for various reasons, primarily physical. The PDF has specific targets to which they are assigned in the event of an emergency. These include reservoirs, power stations, and other key installations on the island. It is not intended that the PDF would ever leave Singapore in the event of an external war.

The training of about 2,200 new personnel annually is expected to raise the strength of the People's Defense Force to about 30,000 by 1979. For the first 6 months of training there are two periods of 3 hours per week, and for the second 6 months, one period of 3 hours per week. After completion of the 1-year basic training course, recruits are posted to a People's Defense Force unit, where they are required to attend a 3-hour training session weekly and spend 1 week in camp annually.

The military portion of People's Defense Force training includes elementary weaponry, firing and care of the AR-15 rifle, map reading, camping, basic logistics, driving, signals, first aid, simple tactics, and marching. The political indoctrination portion, in the long run more important in the government's view, includes instruction on democratic models, communism, Southeast Asian geography and history, and racial tolerance. Instruction is multilingual, although, as in the army, the overwhelming majority of the force speak English.

Better educated citizens called up under the National Service plan are likely to be allocated to the Special Constabulary, a 9,400-man part-time police organization which may expand to 73,000 by 1980. Although the constabulary is a broadly based reserve organization, it includes a substantial number of volunteers and is in all important respects a professional police organization, despite its part-time nature. When on duty, the Special Constabulary performs the same functions as the regular police; its organization also parallels that of the regular police.

Training in the constabulary is the same as in the regular police, except that it is shorter. Eight training centers, located in the eight geographical police divisions, provide courses in law, weapons, self-defense, regulations, patrolling procedures, first aid, and physical fitness. During the first 6 months of training, the inductee attends weekly training periods of 4 hours each. Thereafter, he is assigned to a regular police division to begin regular police duties on a part-time basis. A member is generally expected to work at least one night a week, but the entire constabulary is on call during emergencies. On duty, constabulary members wear regular police uniforms, use regular police equipment, and are empowered to act with the same authority as the regular police. Pay is modest but sufficient to cover personal expenses and provide some incentive.

The poorly educated and the illiterate called up under the National Service plan are assigned to the Vigilante Corps. A large mass organization and catchall for school dropouts, those with low intelligence, and the unemployed or unemployable, the Vigilante Corps is the focus of the National Service plan. It is the organization which will have the greatest impact on the citizens and will afford the greatest opportunity to the government to win over, discipline, and make loyal an element of the population whose support has so far eluded it. Moreover, it is the only organization in the National Service complex that is specifically designed to appeal to the Chinese-educated youth.

The Vigilante Corps was established during the Indonesian confrontation directed against Malaysia to perform the tasks of a citizen militia—patrolling, control of sabotage, arrest of illegal immigrants, and assistance to the police. Membership was composed of neighborhood leaders from every economic level, most of them middle-aged. The Vigilante Corps subsequently was reorganized as a mass youth corps appealing to the Chinese-educated people, with the goal of instilling loyalty, discipline, and sense of responsibility through quasi-military training and indoctrination.

Subordinate to the corps headquarters are eight district headquarters which correspond geographically to the eight police divisions. Each district headquarters is in turn subdivided into three training centers, normally located near the police division headquarters. Vigilante Corps units, each consisting of 170 members under a unit leader and an assistant unit leader, report to the district headquarters as well as to the local community centers. The 170-member units are further subdivided into four groups of about 40 members that are broken down into sections of about 10 members each.

The Vigilante Corps' 12-month training is given in two weekly 4-hour periods for the first 6 months, and during the last 6 months, in a single 4-hour period. The 12-month training period is divided into three major phases. The first includes orientation, citizenship, and civics; the second, physical fitness; and the third, technical instruction. The final phase, conducted by uniformed officers, covers camping, first aid, emergency drill, weapons training, hiking, and marksmanship. Although the weapons training course includes the use of rifles, the primary weapon for training is the truncheon. After 12 months of training, the member is assigned to a unit and must attend a 3-hour meeting per week at the unit's base.

The estimated 15,700 corps members are not paid but are provided with free uniforms and reimbursed for transportation and other minor expenses. The uniform is intended to instill pride in corps membership. The corps program insures that a large number of neighborhood youth use and associate with the community centers. This not only places the youth leadership in close contact with the community center but also with the government and the ruling party. As an outgrowth of its inception as a militia, the corps has the function of a neighborhood security element whose functions include patrolling, reporting on suspicious activities in the neighborhood, and controlling crowds during demonstrations or riots. Through its association with the community centers, the members of the Vigilante Corps draw their families, friends, and relatives into the center's orbit. One of their duties is to recruit actively on behalf of the community centers.

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